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NOTE
Undermining Tribal Land Use Regulatory
Authority: Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
I. INTRODUCTION
The Allotment Act of 1887 diminished tribal regulatory
authority over Indian reservation land use.' While the Act
provided for alienation of reservation land to non-Indians, it
did not terminate the reservation status of alienated land.2
Hence, a question which repeatedly arises is whether Indians
can control land use on non-Indian owned reservation land.
In a recent case, the United States Supreme Court held
that Indians maintain their power to control non-Indian owned
reservation land use only to the extent that Indians exercise
their power to exclude non-Indians from reservations.3 In so
holding, the Court precluded Indians from controlling land use
on non-Indian owned reservation land.
The Court's decision has a major effect on tribal authority
because the power to control land use, including the power to
zone land for different uses, is an essential power of local gov-
ernment.4 Like state and local governments, tribal govern-
ments have enacted comprehensive zoning laws to control
development and to ensure consistency in reservation land use.
By depriving Indians of their sovereign authority to zone all
1. General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (current
version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1988)); Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (Wheeler-
Howard Act), Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479
(1988)).
2. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505-06 (1973) (in legislation enacted subsequent to
the Allotment Act, Congress has stated that Indian Country includes allotted lands).
3. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S.
Ct. 2994 (1989).
4. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 392-95 (1926) (the Court
upheld local government zoning law finding that by segregating residential zones from
business and industrial zones, the important government interests of peaceful
residential environments, increased pedestrian safety, and noise reduction were
served). See generally N. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW §§ 1.01-.08,
7.07, 8.01-.03 (1988).
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reservation land, the Supreme Court severely hampered tribal
efforts to implement comprehensive land use regulation.
This Note traces the historical basis of Indian regulatory
authority over non-Indians, examines the Supreme Court's lat-
est decision in Brendale, and then exposes the weaknesses of
that decision.
II. TRIBAL REGULATORY AUTHORITY ON RESERVATIONS
BEFORE BRENDALE
A. Land Use Control Generally
All discussions of land use in the United States must begin
with the Supreme Court's landmark Euclid decision.5 In 1922,
the village council of Euclid, Ohio adopted a comprehensive
zoning ordinance segregating land use into roughly three cate-
gories: residential, commercial, and industrial. Under the ordi-
nance, industries could only develop land zoned for industrial
use; commercial businesses could only locate on land zoned for
commercial use; and residences could only be built on land
zoned for residential use.6 By restricting different land uses to
separate districts, the village council's objective was to control
development "within definitely fixed lines."7 While controlled
and ordered development seemed laudable, not everyone in
Euclid agreed with the way the council drew the lines.
In a lawsuit which eventually reached the United States
Supreme Court, a realty company in Euclid challenged the
constitutionality of an ordinance restricting it from developing
its residentially zoned land for industrial use. The Ambler
Realty Company asserted that the ordinance was unconstitu-
tional because it deprived the company of liberty and property
without due process-a direct violation of the fourteenth
amendment.' The Court upheld the constitutionality of the
ordinance because it was not capricious or arbitrary; rather, it
was a proper exercise of the police power to protect public
health, safety, morals, and general welfare.9 The ordinance
was not an arbitrary restriction on an individual landowner's
property rights because it comprehensively regulated village
land use for the general welfare of all village members.
5. Euclid, 272 U.S. 365, marked the first Supreme Court approval of zoning.
6. Id. at 379-82.
7. Id. at 388.
8. Id. at 384.
9. Id. at 395.
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Euclid therefore established that land use restrictions
imposed by local governments will be upheld if they compre-
hensively regulate the land for the health, safety, morals, and
general welfare of its residents. Simply put, land use controls
must be developed pursuant to some comprehensive plan for
the public welfare.'0 Permitting individual landowners to
develop and use their land however they wish opens the door
to conflicting neighboring land uses, chaos, and confusion." It
is this random and uncontrolled development that threatens
the public welfare.' 2
Pursuant to state zoning enabling legislation, local govern-
ments enact zoning laws to control development. As Euclid
demonstrates, zoning is the primary means by which local
authorities restrict various uses to certain districts to achieve
comprehensive land use control. 13 Comprehensive zoning pro-
vides at least four specific benefits: (1) it permits local govern-
ment to assess how different land uses interrelate; (2) it
provides a single authority to consider a locality's need for pub-
lic facilities; (3) it allows local government to make sound land
use decisions in light of dwindling natural resources; and (4) it
permits local government to assess the needs of all landowners
concerned.' 4
B. Land Use Control on the Reservation
Tribal governments have enacted zoning laws to control
reservation land use.'" As described below, the tribal regula-
tory authority over reservation land use has been grounded on
Indian sovereignty.
In 1763, King George of Great Britain proclaimed that the
King held title to all North American Indian land "discovered"
by British subjects, but that Indians retained the right to
10. N. WILLIAMS, JR., supra note 4, at § 7.07.
11. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 392-95.
12. Id.
13. Local governments also control land use through taxation, eminent domain
proceedings, and restrictive covenants.
14. N. WILLIAMS, JR., supra note 4, at § 1.08.
15. See, e.g., YAKIMA NATION ZONING CODE, cited in Yakima Nation's Consolidated
Brief Answering as Plaintiff-Appellee and Opening as Plaintiff-Appellant at 47,
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 828 F.2d 529
(9th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989) (No. 85-4433, 85-
4383) [hereinafter Nation's Brief ].
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occupy and use such land.16 Partly on the basis of this procla-
mation, the United States Supreme Court's position in 1832
was that "Indian nations [are] distinct political communities,
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is
exclusive."' 7 The Court, in effect, acknowledged the sover-
eignty of Indians over tribal land.
Sovereignty is "the unrestricted right of groups of people
to organize themselves in political, social and cultural patterns
that meet their needs.' 8 Moreover, sovereignty includes the
right of people to determine how land is to be used for the
common good. 19 Sovereignty gives rise to the "power" or
"authority" to establish a government and to exercise powers
of self-government, including the power to regulate land use.2 °
Given their sovereignty, Indians should possess regulatory
authority over reservation land use.
Brendale, however, dramatically changed the relationship
between states and sovereign tribes. States are no longer pre-
empted from asserting their authority over tribal relations
with non-Indians. The traditional view concerning the applica-
tion of state law to reservation activities was established in
Worcester v. Georgia in which the United States Supreme
Court held that Georgia State law was inapplicable to Chero-
kee Indian Nation trust lands.2' The basis for the Court's deci-
sion was the early federal view that Indians were sovereign as
to the states, but dependent upon the federal government.22
One year before Worcester, Chief Justice John Marshall stated
that an Indian nation's "relation to the United States resem-
bles that of a ward to his guardian."23 Over a century later, in
Williams v. Lee, the Supreme Court affirmed its earlier view.24
16. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543-44, 548 (1832).
17. See id. at 557.
18. K. KICKINGBIRD, INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 2 (1977) (quoting Mike Meyers a Seneca
Indian consultant to the Institute for the Development of Indian Law).
19. Id. (quoting Mike Meyers).
20. Id. at 6. Sovereign people may also possess the power to make and enforce
laws, to tax, to regulate trade within their land's borders, to determine membership,
and to regulate domestic relations. Id. at 5.
21. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561. The Court held that a Georgia State law requiring
non-Indian resident missionaries of the Cherokee Nation to obtain permits was
inapplicable to the missionaries because the Cherokee Nation was a distinct entity
upon which Georgia State law had no force. Id.
22. Id. at 554-59.
23. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
24. 358 U.S. 217 (1958). Lee, a non-Indian who operated a trading post on the
Navajo Indian Reservation, sued Williams, a Navajo Indian, in Arizona Superior Court
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Citing Worcester, the Court held that, absent a congressional
act conferring state power over Indian affairs, state courts
lacked jurisdiction over such affairs.25
Acting substantially like local governments, tribes have
exercised their fundamental right to zone reservations. For
example, the Yakima Indian Nation has enacted a zoning code
for the Yakima Indian Reservation. 26 Because reservation
landowners include non-Indian, nonmember Indian,27 and
Indian landowners, reservations have a "checkerboard"
appearance with both non-Indians and Indians dispersed
throughout. The checkerboard appearance of reservations
resulted from two federal acts: the General Allotment Act of
1887 (Dawes Act)28 and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
(Wheeler-Howard Act).29
The Dawes Act attempted to achieve Indian assimilation
by parceling out reservation lands to Indian families.
Lawmakers believed that it woiuld be beneficial to Indians to
eventually disintegrate the reservations and assimilate the
tribes into the United States "melting pot."3 Yet, once alloted
lands became freely transferable, Indians sold reservation
lands to non-Indians resulting in the loss of nearly ninety mil-
to collect for goods sold on credit to Williams. The question before the Court
concerned state power over affairs between Indians and non-Indians.
25. Id. at 219-20. Addressing the question of tribal authority over the non-Indian,
Lee, Chief Justice Black stated:
It is immaterial that respondent [Lee] is not an Indian. He was on the
Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took place there .... The
cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian
governments over their reservations .... If this power is to be taken away
from them, it is for Congress to do it.
Id. at 223 (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-66 (1903)).
26. YAKIMA COUNTY, WASH. ZONING CODE (1972). As the Ninth Circuit noted, "By
enacting zoning ordinances, a tribe attempts to protect against the damage caused by
uncontrolled development, which can affect all the residents and land of the
reservation." Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v.
Whiteside, 828 F.2d 529, 534 (9th Cir. 1987) (footnote omitted), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 109
S. Ct. 2994 (1989).
27. A nonmember Indian is an Indian who is not a member of the particular tribe
regulating the reservation. Though caselaw sometimes distinguishes between
nonmember Indians and non-Indians, the issues are essentially the same for both types
of landowners. Consequently, for simplicity, any references in this article to non-
Indians shall include nonmember Indians.
28. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1988)).
29. Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988)).
30. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 131 n.39 (1982).
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lion acres previously held by Indians in 1887.31 In 1934, the
Wheeler-Howard Act abolished allotment to preserve what
was left of the diminished reservations. Thus, federal policy
toward Indians completely reversed. However, while the
Wheeler-Howard Act prohibited future allotment of Indian
land, it provided no solution for the damage that had already
occurred.
When the Dawes Act made Indian land transferable, much
of it was sold to non-Indians. It is this concurrent ownership of
reservation land by Indians and non-Indians that is at the
heart of many conflicts between Indian law and state law. The
conflict between Indian and state zoning laws is the issue that
the Supreme Court dealt with in Brendale.2 Conflicts arise
from checkerboard zoning, where both state and tribal zoning
laws control reservation land use. For example, a state and a
tribe may impose different zoning laws upon the same parcel
of non-Indian reservation fee .land. This concurrent exercise of
zoning laws not only precipitates conflict between incompatible
state and tribal zoning laws, but it also precludes either the
county or the tribe from obtaining the benefits of comprehen-
sive reservation land use regulation. Unless tribes and states
enact compatible zoning laws, or devise cooperative zoning
schemes, land use on reservations will not follow any predict-
able, logical pattern. As a result of neighboring incompatible
land uses, the uncertainty and chaos will lead to litigation and
the general welfare of all reservation inhabitants will be at
stake.33
C. Supreme Court Decisions Leading Up to Brendale
As the Dawes Act gave rise to checkerboard reservations,
questions arose regarding tribal authority over non-Indian res-
ervation landowners. Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate
the Court's reluctance to find that tribes retain their sovereign
31. For an excellent discussion of the Dawes Act and the resulting loss of Indian-
owned lands, see F. COHEN, supra note 30, at 130-40.
32. 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989).
33. See, e.g., Knight v. Shoshone & Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir.
1982) (non-Indian reservation landowners sought to subdivide their fee lands contrary
to the Shoshone/Arapahoe tribal zoning code); Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Wash. 1985) (nonmember
reservation fee landowner sought to develop land where tribe barred development);
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F.
Supp. 750 (E.D. Wash. 1985) (non-Indian reservation fee landowner sued to subdivide
land Yakima Nation had zoned for agricultural use).
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authority to regulate non-Indian reservation landowners.34
Consequently, state power over matters involving non-Indians
and Indians has increased.
In United States v. Mazuie, the Court held that tribal reg-
ulatory authority over non-Indians was limited to the authority
the federal government delegated to Indians.3' The Court rea-
soned that delegation to Indians was proper "where the [tribal]
entity exercising the delegated authority itself possesses
independent authority over the subject matter."36 Indians were
found to possess such independent authority over non-Indian
use of reservation land. The Mazurie Court found this author-
ity to be rooted in Indian sovereignty.37 However, three years
after Mazurie, the Supreme Court dealt a severe blow to tribal
regulatory authority.3
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Court held
that the Suquamish lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans because "[b]y submitting to the overriding sovereignty of
the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up
their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States
except in a manner acceptable to Congress. '39 While Oliphant
only concerned Indian criminal jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court has applied the ruling much more broadly.40
In United States v. Wheeler, the Court cited Oliphant for
the proposition that "Indian tribes still possess those aspects of
sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implica-
tion as a necessary result of their dependent status."'" In stat-
ing that Indian sovereignty had diminished because of the
tribe's "dependent status," the Court extended the Oliphant
34. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). One reason why the
Supreme Court has not allowed tribes to assert their authority over non-Indians is
because often non-Indians are not represented on tribal councils. Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994, 3011
(1989). See also infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
35. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (Court approved federal
delegation of regulatory authority to tribes in area of liquor control).
36. Id. at 556-57 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304,
319-22 (1936)).
37. Id. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that "it is an important aspect of this case
[United States v. Mazuriel that Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing
attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory." Id. at 557
(citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832)).
38. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
39. Id. at 210.
40. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
41. Id. at 323 (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191).
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divestiture rule to civil as well as criminal matters. The Oli-
phant decision did not address the issue of tribal jurisdiction
over civil matters; the Court merely held that tribal jurisdic-
tion over criminal matters had eroded because of the tribe's
dependent status as to the United States.42 Therefore, the
Court's extension of the Oliphant rule in Wheeler was
questionable.
Two years after Wheeler, the Court whittled Oliphant
back down to near its original breadth in Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation.43 The Col-
ville Court declared that "[t]ribal powers are not implicitly
divested by virtue of the tribes' dependent status. This Court
has found such divestiture in cases where the exercise of tribal
sovereignty would be inconsistent with the overriding interests
of the National Government. '4 4  Because divestiture only
results when tribal authority is inconsistent with federal inter-
ests, the Colville test is less restrictive of tribal 'regulatory
authority than the Wheeler interpretation of the Oliphant
test. 5
The Supreme Court's approach changed yet again in
United States v. Montana46 when Oliphant was again applied
broadly.47  In ruling that the Crow tribe could regulate non-
42. Id. at 326.
43. 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (Court upheld the exercise of Indian regulatory power over
business transactions involving non-Indians).
44. Id. at 153 (emphasis added). As tribal taxation did not frustrate any overriding
federal interest, the Court upheld the exercise of tribal authority and reminded its
audience that "tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal
Government, not the States." Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
45. R. Johnson, Zoning for Environmental Protection on Indian Reservations 168
(Sept. 15-16, 1988) (CLE presentation for Indian Law symposium at University of
Washington School of Law).
46. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). In Montana, the Crow Indians asserted their sovereign
authority to regulate hunting and fishing on reservation fee lands owned by
nonmembers. However, the State of Montana argued that it had superior authority to
regulate nonmember hunting and fishing on the reservation. Id, at 549.
47. While the Supreme Court applied Oliphant more broadly in Montana, the
Court subsequently ruled that Oliphant was not applicable to cases involving civil
subject matter jurisdiction:
[A]lithough Congress' decision to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the
federal courts to offenses committed by non-Indians against Indians within
Indian country supported the holding in Oliphant, there is no comparable
legislation granting the federal courts jurisdiction over civil disputes between
Indians and non-Indians that arise on an Indian reservation.
National Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 854 (1985).
Two years later, the Supreme Court upheld its ruling in National Farmers Union
when it concluded: "Although the criminal jurisdiction of the tribal courts is subject
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member hunting and fishing only on tribe-owned fee lands, the
Montana Court found that Indians retained their inherent sov-
ereignty when internal tribal relations were threatened. 4
However, with respect to external relations (those involving
non-Indians) the Court held that the tribe had been implicitly
divested of its sovereignty because of its dependent status.4 9 In
extending Oliphant beyond its original scope the Court rea-
soned: "Though Oliphant only determined inherent tribal
authority in criminal matters, the principles on which it relied
support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of non-
members of the tribe."5 ° The Court found that the tribe had
been divested of its regulatory authority over hunting and fish-
ing on non-Indian owned fee lands because the State of Mon-
tana had applied its regulatory laws to non-Indian hunting and
fishing on the reservation.5'
In restricting the domain of tribal authority, the Montana
Court presumed against any exercise of tribal authority over
non-Indians. However, there is an exception to Montana's gen-
eral rule. In addition to the power to regulate nonmembers
who enter into consensual relations with Indians, a tribe may
regulate non-Indians when their "conduct threatens or has
to substantial federal limitation, see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978), their civil jurisdiction is not similarly restricted." Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v.
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1986) (citing National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 854-55
nn.16 & 17).
Most recently, in Brendale, when the Yakima Nation cited National Farmers
Union and Iowa Mutual as the basis for tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indian land
use on fee lands, the Supreme Court offered a surprising and new interpretation of
these two decisions:
In neither of those cases did the Court decide whether the Indian tribe had
authority over the nonmembers involved. Instead, the Court established an
exhaustion rule, allowing the tribal courts initially to determine whether they
have jurisdiction, and left open the possibility that the exercise of jurisdiction
could be later challenged in federal court.
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct.
2994, 3006 n.10 (1989) (citing National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856-57; Iowa Mutual,
480 U.S. at 16, 19).
48. Montana, 450 U.S. at 563-65.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 565. The soundness of this proposition is questionable. See supra note 41
and accompanying text. Indeed, in a subsequent opinion, Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671
F.2d 363, 365-66 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982), the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals challenged the soundness of this notion. See infra note 64.
51. Montana, 450 U.S. at 549. The Court reasoned that since the Crow Tribe and
the State of Montana "had accommodated themselves to the state regulation," the
tribe, arguably, had not exhibited any unique tribal interest in regulating non-Indian
hunting and fishing. Id. at 565 n.13.
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some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."52
While the Colville rule presumes the existence of inherent
tribal regulatory authority, Montana represents a Supreme
Court shift back in favor of state regulatory authority over
non-Indians. However, the Montana exception undermines the
general rule, and lower federal courts after Montana applied
this exception to find in favor of tribal regulatory authority
over non-Indians.53
In Knight v. Shoshone & Arapahoe Indian Tribes, a case
strikingly similar to Brendale, non-Indian landowners within
the perimeter of the Wind River Reservation sought to subdi-
vide their fee lands contrary to the tribal zoning code.' The
tribes sued to enjoin the development. The non-Indians con-
tended that, absent congressionally delegated authority, the
tribes could not regulate land use upon non-Indian owned res-
ervation lands.55 The district court found in favor of the tribes
and granted the injunction.
56
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the injunction and
held that Indians have "attributes of sovereignty" over their
territory.57 As sovereigns, tribes retain a "broad measure of
civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on Indian
reservation lands in which the tribes have a significant inter-
est.' '58  Specifically, the court indicated that civil jurisdiction
52. Id. at 565. The Montana test is noteworthy because while the general rule is
that Indians lack any inherent right to exercise tribal authority over non-Indians, the
exception virtually swallows the rule. R. Johnson, supra note 45, at 168. Indeed,
beyond internal tribal relations, whenever a tribe's political integrity, economic
security, or health or welfare is threatened by non-Indian conduct upon non-Indian-
owned reservation fee lands, the tribe has the authority to regulate the non-Indian
conduct.
53. Note, Zoning: Controlling Land Use on the Checkerboard: The Zoning Powers
of Indian Tribes After Montana v. United States, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 187, 207 (1982)
[hereinafter Controlling Land Use]. Interestingly, the Supreme Court may have been
sensitive to lower federal court reactions to Montana because less than one year after
its Montana decision, the Supreme Court relied heavily on Colville to support its
finding that the Jicarilla Apache Tribe had inherent authority to impose a severance
tax on non-Indian lessees who removed oil and gas from tribal lands. Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982). One author suggests that in swinging
back to its Colville approach, the Supreme Court attempted to soften the harshness of
the Montana rule. Controlling Land Use, supra, at 206.
54. 670 F.2d 900, 901 (10th Cir. 1982).
55. Id. at 902.
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing Merrion, 455 U.S. at 140).
58. Id. (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-53 (1980)).
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over non-Indians was proper where the non-Indians' conduct
threatened tribal interests.5 9 In so holding, the Knight court
applied the Montana exception.
Under the Montana exception, the tribes had a substantial
interest in regulating the non-Indians. Because of tribal activi-
ties adjacent to or nearby the subject lands, the tribes were
concerned about the impact that the subdivision would have
upon neighboring tribal land uses. First, the tribes owned
trust land adjacent to the subject land. ° Second, the tribes
held annual tribal ceremonies within five miles of the pro-
posed subdivision.61 Finally, two Indian schools, two Indian
cemeteries, and an Indian activity hall were also within five
miles of the subject lands.2 Given the tribal interests at stake,
the Tenth Circuit properly held that tribal zoning controlled.6 3
The court found that the tribes faced the risks of incom-
patible neighboring land uses, probable litigation, uncertainty,
and conflicting land use. Rather than yield to checkerboard
zoning, the court recognized the tribes' sovereign authority to
regulate the reservation under a comprehensive zoning
scheme.64
59. Id. (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)).
60. Id. at 903.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id. In affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit based its
decision partly on the evidence of the tribes' significant and substantial interest in the
subject lands. It also based it on the fact that there did not appear to be any state
attempt to concurrently regulate land use upon the reservation. However, even if the
state had attempted to apply its zoning law to non-Indian owned reservation fee lands,
the court of appeals might still have affirmed the decision. The Knight court, like the
Colville court, was concerned with federal, not state preemption of tribal law: "no
treaty provision is of any pertinence and Congress has not acted to delegate or deny
the right to control use of non-Indian owned land located within the reservation." Id.
at 902 (emphasis added).
64. See Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 392-395 (1926); see
also Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 961, 963 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, City of Polson, Montana v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes
of the Flathead Reservation, 459 U.S. 977 (1982). Namen involved an attempt by the
tribes to prohibit non-Indian, lake-front landowners from building and maintaining a
storage shed, docks and a breakwater upon reservation fee lands. Id. at 951. The court
of appeals found no overriding federal interests sufficient to divest the tribes of their
authority to regulate non-Indian fee landowners. Id. at 963. The court held that, even
under Montana, the tribe possessed the authority to regulate non-Indians where the
latter's conduct potentially affected tribal interests. Id. at 964.
Specifically, if the non-Indians' conduct went unregulated by tribal zoning, it
"could increase water pollution, damage the ecology of the lake, interfere with treaty
fishing rights, or otherwise harm the lake, which is one of the most important tribal
resources." Id. The Namen court correctly recognized that the tribe's interest in
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As Knight and other post-Montana cases demonstrate,
lower federal courts have refused to adopt Montana's question-
able divestiture rule.6" They have instead held that tribes may
regulate non-Indian conduct which threatens tribal interests,
particularly the tribal interest in implementing comprehensive
reservation land use regulation. Having discussed the back-
ground of tribal regulatory authority over non-Indian reserva-
tion landowners, this Note will next address the tribal
regulatory issues in Brendale.
III. THE LOWER COURT BRENDALE DECISIONS: WHITESIDE I
AND WHITESIDE II
Brendale is the consolidation of two lower federal court
protecting reservation resources was superior to the non-Indian landowners' interest
in developing their land more aggressively than permitted under tribal law. Another
Ninth Circuit case that upheld the exercise of tribal regulatory authority over non-
Indians was Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967
(1982). John Cardin was a non-Indian who owned land on the Quinault Indian
Reservation upon which he operated a grocery and general store. Id. at 364. The
dispute arose when Cardin's store failed to meet tribal building, health and safety
regulations. Id. Cardin sued to enjoin the tribe from applying its regulatory laws to
non-Indian owned land, and the district court granted the injunction, relying largely
on the Oliphant divestiture rule. Id. at 364-65. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed
and allowed the exercise of tribal regulatory authority thereby affirming "the
Supreme Court's repeated assertions that Indian tribes retain attributes of sovereignty
over their territory, not just their members." Id. at 366.
The Cardin court refused to adopt Montana, finding that tribal authority to
regulate land use takes precedence when non-Indian conduct threatens tribal interests.
Cardin is also important because it dismissed the Montana Court's proposition that
Oliphant was applicable to civil cases. Writing for a unanimous tribunal, Judge
Pregerson stated that nothing in the Oliphant Court's analysis "suggests that Indian
civil or regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians is inconsistent with Indians'
dependent status." Id. at 365-66. In so holding, the court found Montana's general
divestiture rule unsound.
One additional Ninth Circuit case that applied the Montana exception concerned
tribal authority to regulate two non-Indian, off-reservation automobile dealers. See
Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Tribe, 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1983). Under Navajo Tribal
law, before the dealers could repossess Indian vehicles, they had to obtain the
purchaser's written consent. "Id. at 590. The dealers sued in federal district court
alleging that the tribe had been divested of its authority to regulate the on-reservation
repossession of Indian vehicles. Id. at 590. The court of appeals found no divestiture of
Indian authority and held instead that the exercise of tribal authority over the non-
Indians was appropriate where the regulation protected tribal health and safety.
Specifically, the tribe was concerned about repossession without consent which might
result in conflict. Id. at 593.
In applying the Montana exception rather than the rule, the Babbitt Ford court
followed the post-Montana lower federal court pattern. Lower federal courts have not
given much attention to Montana's general divestiture rule. Controlling Land Use,
supra note 53, at 208.
65. See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
decisions both entitled Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside.6" For clarity and com-
parison, they shall be referred to as Whiteside I and Whiteside
II.
Whiteside I, or the Closed Area case, concerned tribal reg-
ulation of non-Indian land in a portion of the reservation that
the Yakima Nation had closed to the public to protect the
area's grazing, forest, and wildlife resources. 67 Conversely,
Whiteside II, or the Open Area case, concerned non-Indian
land located within a portion of the reservation generally open
to the public. A description of the Yakima Reservation more
clearly illustrates how the cases differ.
The Yakima Reservation is located in southeastern Wash-
ington. The United States holds eighty percent of the 1.3 mil-
lion acres of reservation land "in trust" for the benefit of tribal
members. The remaining twenty percent is held in fee by Indi-
ans and non-Indians, or in trust for nonmembers.
Most of the trust land is in the Closed Area, which is
predominantly forested and relatively undeveloped. There are
few permanent residences.68 The Yakima Nation limits access
to the Closed Area to members of the Yakima Tribe, employ-
ees, and permittees. 9 On the other hand, most of the fee land
is located in the Open Area, which is composed mostly of land
used for grazing, agriculture, commercial, and residential pur-
poses.7 ° Unlike the Closed Area, there is no restriction upon
public access; the area is open to anyone. 71 Although non-Indi-
ans are essentially excluded from the Closed Area, non-Indians
and Indians are not segregated in the Open Area. Conse-
quently, the Yakima Reservation has a "checkerboard" appear-
ance arising from the co-existence of Indian and non-Indian
owned lands.
Philip Brendale was a permittee and fee owner of 160
acres in the middle of the forested portion of the Closed Area.
Although he was an Indian, he was not a Yakima Tribe mem-
66. 617 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Wash. 1985) (W~hiteside I) and 617 F. Supp. 750 (E.D.
Wash. 1985) (Whiteside II), consolidated, aff'd in part, and rev'd in part, 828 F.2d 529
(9th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989).
67. Whiteside I, 617 F. Supp. at 738 (citing Tribal Resolution of the Yakima Indian
Nation (Aug. 11, 1954)).
68. Id. at 19-22.
69. Id. at 20.
70. Id. at 22-23.
71. Id. at 22.
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ber. In April 1983, Brendale filed an application with Yakima
County to subdivide one of his twenty-acre parcels into ten
two-acre lots. Brendale planned to sell the lots, each with
independent sewage and water facilities, as sites for summer
cabins and recreational vehicles. Brendale submitted an envi-
ronmental checklist and the Yakima County Planning Depart-
ment declared that Brendale did not have to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).72
The Yakima Nation appealed the Department's conclusion
to the Yakima County Board of Commissioners. The Yakima
Nation asserted that Yakima County lacked the authority to
zone Brendale's property, and that an EIS was warranted given
the threat the proposed development posed to the Closed
Area.73 Although the Department subsequently decided to
require an EIS, the Yakima Nation sued in federal district
court to enjoin the proposed development altogether.74 The
central issue in the dispute was whether Indian or county zon-
ing law was applicable to Brendale's land. Simply put, county
zoning law permitted the proposed development, while Indian
zoning law did not.' 5
Whiteside II, the Open Area case, also involved a conflict
between county zoning law, which would have permitted more
aggressive development, and tribal zoning law, which would
have barred it. In Whiteside II, Stanley Wilkinson, a non-
Indian fee landowner of an undeveloped forty-acre tract,
applied to the county to subdivide thirty-two acres into twenty
single family residential lots. Like Brendale, Wilkinson sub-
mitted an environmental checklist to the Yakima County Plan-
ning Department. After reviewing the checklist, the
Department declared that an EIS was unnecessary. The
Yakima Nation appealed the Department's decision on two
grounds. It argued that Yakima County lacked the authority
to regulate Wilkinson's property, and that since the proposed
subdivision would significantly affect the reservation environ-
ment an EIS was required. The Board of County Commission-
ers heard the appeal and affirmed the Department's decision.
72. Id. at 29-33. The Yakima County Board of Commissioners subsequently
concluded that an EIS was warranted; however, the Yakima Nation's appeal was
already underway. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994, 3001 & n.3 (1989).
73. Nation's Brief, supra note 15, at 32.
74. Whiteside I, 617 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Wash. 1985).
75. Nation's Brief, supra note 15, at 25-28.
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Thereafter, the Yakima Nation sued in federal district court to
enjoin the county from applying its zoning law to the Wilkin-
son property.76
As in Whiteside I, Yakima Nation zoning prohibited the
proposed development while Yakima County zoning did not.
Thus, in both Whiteside I and Whiteside II, the ultimate ques-
tion was whether the county or the tribe possessed the author-
ity to zone non-Indian reservation land.77 To resolve the
zoning question, the federal district court applied the Montana
exception and held in favor of the tribe in Whiteside I, but
against the tribe in Whiteside II.78
In Whiteside I, the court held that, because Brendale's
proposed development threatened tribal interests, Yakima
Nation zoning controlled.7 9 Aside from the threat the develop-
ment posed to tribal timber production, the court's "paramount
concern .. .[was] the threat to the Closed Area's cultural and
spiritual values."8" It was these significant tribal interests that
led the court to conclude that the Yakima Nation had a supe-
rior interest in applying its zoning law to protect reservation
inhabitants.8 1 In addition, the court noted that the county's
interest in applying its zoning law to Brendale's property was
minimal by comparison. 2
In Whiteside II, on the other hand, the court found that
Wilkinson's proposed development in the Open Area did not
threaten the tribe's political integrity, economic security, or
health and welfare. Specifically, Yakima County's zoning ade-
quately regulated land use on Open Area fee lands and did not
threaten Yakima Nation trust lands.8 3 The Yakima Nation
failed to convince the court that the potential impact suffi-
ciently threatened tribal interests. Brendale appealed the deci-
76. Whiteside II, 617 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. Wash. 1985).
77. Under tribal zoning, Wilkinson's property was located in an "agricultural" use
zone where the construction of subdivision housing was prohibited. Nation's Brief,
supra note 15, at 26. Moreover, while Wilkinson sought to subdivide thirty-two acres
into twenty 1.6 acre lots, the minimum lot size in the agricultural zone was five acres.
Id. By contrast, the county's designation for Wilkinson's property was "general rural,"
which allowed a broader range of uses and only required half-acre minimum lot sizes.
Id. at 28-29. Thus, if the Yakima Nation's zoning law controlled, it would bar
Wilkinson's proposed development.
78. Whiteside I, 617 F. Supp. at 742-43; Whiteside II, 617 F. Supp. at 758.
79. Whiteside I, 617 F. Supp. at 742-43 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
80. Whiteside I, 617 F. Supp. at 744.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 743.
83. Whiteside II, 617 F. Supp. at 758.
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sion in Whiteside I and the Yakima Nation appealed the
decision in Whiteside II. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
consolidated the cases, affirmed Whiteside I, and reversed and
remanded Whiteside 11.84
With respect to the Closed Area development, the appel-
late court agreed with the district court's finding that the
Yakima Nation's zoning law controlled because of the threat
Brendale's project posed to tribal interests.8 5 As to Wilkinson's
proposed subdivision in the Open Area, the Ninth Circuit
pointed to Yakima County's failure to establish "any off-reser-
vation interest in imposing its zoning code on fee land within
the reservation. ' 86 In particular, the court noted that "Itihe
exercise of state authority which imposes additional burdens
on a tribal enterprise must ordinarily be justified by functions
or services performed by the State in connection with the on-
reservation activity.""7 Although the appellate court ruled in
Whiteside II that the Yakima Nation had the authority to zone
Wilkinson's land, it remanded the case on the question of
whether tribal or county zoning was applicable. 8
Brendale, Wilkinson, and Yakima County each appealed
the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Supreme Court granted certi-
orari and consolidated the cases.8 9
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN BRENDALE
On June 29, 1989, the Supreme Court announced its deci-
sion in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation. The decision is complex because the
Justices issued three separate opinions resulting in two
pluralities.
Justice Stevens prepared the Court's opinion in Whiteside
84. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 828
F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1987).
85. Id. at 535.
86. Id. at 536.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 535-36. To clarify: in both the Open Area and Closed Area cases, the
Ninth Circuit declared that the tribe had the authority to regulate non-Indian fee
landowners. Id. Moreover, with respect to the Closed Area case, the court held that a
balancing test indicated tribal interests were superior to county interests. Id. at 535.
Accordingly, Yakima Nation tribal zoning controlled in the Closed Area. The court
remanded because the district court had failed to balance the federal, tribal, and
county interests. Id. at 536.
89. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 108
S. Ct. 2843 (1988).
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I, announcing the Court's affirmance of the Ninth Circuit's
decision in the Closed Area case.90 According to Justice Ste-
vens's Whiteside I opinion, the Yakima Nation's power to
exclude 91 non-Indians has been diminished by the alienation of
tribal lands to nonmembers under the Allotment Act: "[I]t is
... improbable that Congress envisioned that the Tribe would
retain its interest in regulating the use of vast ranges of land
sold in fee to nonmembers who lack any voice in setting tribal
policy."'92 In Whiteside I, Justice Stevens reasoned that tribal
power to shape the character of the land through land use reg-
ulation derives from the power to exclude.93 By maintaining
the power to exclude, the Yakima Nation preserved its power
to regulate nonmember owned lands. Thus, in the Closed
Area, because more land was still reserved for the tribe's
exclusive use, the tribe retained its power to shape the charac-
ter of that land.
However, in the Open Area, because the tribe could no
longer exclude nonmembers from a large portion of this area,
the tribe's power to exclude had been diminished. In White-
side I, Stevens reasoned that, as the power to exclude dimin-
ishes, the power to shape the character of that land also
diminishes.94 Justice Stevens, concurring with Justice White's
opinion in Whiteside II, felt that tribal zoning controlled the
proposed development of Brendale's property, while county
zoning controlled the proposed development of Wilkinson's
property. 95
Justice White prepared the Court's opinion in Whiteside
II, the Open Area case, which reversed the Ninth Circuit's rul-
ing.9 6  Under the resulting plurality opinion, the Yakima
Nation's treaty with the United States did not establish that
the Yakima Nation had exclusive authority to regulate non-
90. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 109
S. Ct. 2994, 3009 (1989). Justice O'Connor joined Stevens, while Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Brennan concurred in the result. Justices Scalia, White, and Kennedy,
and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.
91. Justice Stevens stated that the Yakima Nation's power to exclude is derived
from the 1855 treaty between the United States and the Yakima Indian Nation, June 9,
1855, 12 Stat. 951-52. Brendale, 109 S. Ct. at 3012.
92. Id. at 3011.
93. Id. at 3015.
94. Id. at 3016-17.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 3009. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined in
Justice White's opinion. Id. at 2996. Justices Stevens and O'Connor concurred, id. at
3009, while Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented, id. at 3017.
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Indian owned reservation lands. Rather, in accordance with
Montana, "treaty rights with respect to Reservation lands must
be read in light of the subsequent alienation of those lands."97
Specifically, in Whiteside II, Justice White reasoned that
because reservation land had been alienated to non-Indians,
tribal treaty rights had diminished.9"
As in Montana, non-Indians had acquired Yakima Reser-
vation lands, and the Court reasoned that Congress did not
intend to permit tribes to regulate non-Indians. While the
Wheeler-Howard Act99 may have ended future alienation of
reservation lands, Justice White reasoned that it did not give
Indians the right to exclusive use of alienated lands.1 °° Any
treaty-derived power to exclude had been diminished by the
alienation of Yakima Reservation lands.
The Whiteside II plurality also concluded that the Yakima
Nation's sovereign authority to regulate non-Indian activity
had been divested. It reasoned that, to the extent that the
exercise of tribal authority involved the tribe's external rela-
tions with non-Indians, the Yakima Nation had been divested
of such authority. Because Brendale involved fee lands, the
plurality distinguished it from Colville'01 which dealt with tri-
bal regulation of trust lands.'0 2 In Whiteside II, Justice White
also distinguished Brendale from those cases in which Con-
gress expressly delegated regulatory authority over non-
Indians.
Justice White reasoned that since Congress had not
expressly delegated the authority to zone non-Indian fee lands
to the Yakima Nation, the Yakima Nation lacked any inherent
authority to zone such lands. He acknowledged that tribes
may possess the authority to regulate non-Indian activity (1)
where the tribe has entered into consensual relations with
non-Indians through commercial dealing, contracts, or other
arrangements, or (2) where non-Indian conduct threatens tri-
bal interests. 1
0 3
97. Id. at 3004 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 561 (1981)).
98. Id.
99. Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988)).
100. Brendale, 109 S. Ct. at 3004.
101. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134 (1980); supra text accompanying note 44.
102. Brendale, 109 S. Ct. at 3006.
103. Id. at 3006-07. Specifically, the Whiteside II plurality directed its readers to
compare the situation in these consolidated cases to other instances in which Congress
has expressly delegated to tribes federal authority over non-Indian landowners. Id.
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However, in Justice White's discussion of Montana's rela-
tion to Brendale, he asserted that the Montana exception did
not create tribal authority to zone reservation lands.10 4 Tribes
must first demonstrate that protectable interests are imper-
iled.'0 5 Justice White found that the Yakima Nation lacked the
authority to zone Wilkinson's land because it was unable to
demonstrate that protectable interests would be threatened by
Wilkinson's development in the Open Area.106
Justice Blackmun concurred with the plurality in White-
side I, but dissented as to the plurality judgment in Whiteside
II.107 Regarding Whiteside II, Justice Blackmun warned that
tribal attempts to zone comprehensively would be frustrated if
the Montana exception was not used as the basis for tribal
authority to zone non-Indian land. Blackmun urged that Mon-
tana be read to give tribes inherent authority to zone all fee
lands, including those owned by non-Indians.'
According to Blackmun, several Supreme Court cases
clearly establish that Indians retain sovereign authority over
non-Indians unless tribal authority is inconsistent with federal
interests.10 9 He noted that civil jurisdiction cases subsequent to
Montana reaffirm the view that tribes retain civil jurisdiction
over non-Indians. Additionally, Blackmun asserted that
despite their incorporation into dominant society, tribes are
not divested of civil jurisdiction over non-Indian reservation
landowners. 110
Justice Blackmun argued that zoning is a fundamental
function of local government. The power to zone is especially
important to tribal governments because Indians "enjoy a
Congress has made such expressed delegations in the Indian Country Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1161 (1988), and in the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (e) and (h)(1)
(1988).
104. Brendale, 109 S. Ct. at 3007.
105. Id.
106. Id. (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
107. Id. at 3017 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall joined
in Justice Blackmun's dissent.
108. Id. at 3021-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 3020-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (Court upheld tribe's internal authority to impose a
severance tax upon non-Indian reservation mining); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,
480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (civil jurisdiction over non-Indians is a recognized part of inherent
tribal sovereignty and exists "unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision
or a federal statute."); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980) (tribes retain substantial civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians); see supra notes 43-45, 47, 53 and accompanying text.
110. Brendale, 109 S. Ct. at 3020 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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unique historical and cultural connection to the land.""'1
According to Blackmun, the Montana exception allows tribes
to retain authority over non-Indians whenever the latter's con-
duct threatens tribal interests." 2 With respect to Whiteside I
and Whiteside II, Justice Blackmun concluded that the threat
to the Yakima Nation was the loss of the authority to zone the
reservation comprehensively. 1 3 Given this threat, he urged
that the Yakima Nation be permitted to regulate all of its
lands, even those owned by non-Indians.
114
V. A CRITIQUE OF BRENDALE
Brendale established that, to the extent a tribe tries to
exclude non-Indians from the reservation, the tribe preserves
its power to regulate non-Indian reservation landowners. This
holding can be attacked on two principal grounds. First, under
the Montana exception, Yakima Nation zoning should have
controlled in the Open Area. If the Supreme Court had
remanded Whiteside II for a balance of tribal, state, and fed-
eral interests, the Yakima Nation would very likely have pre-
vailed. Second, from a land use policy perspective, tribal zoning
should control, even if it affects non-Indian reservation
landowners.
A. Yakima Nation Zoning Should Have Controlled Under
the Montana Exception
When the appellate court remanded Whiteside II for a bal-
ancing of interests analysis, it recognized that several compel-
ling arguments existed in favor of tribal zoning." 5 First,
Wilkinson's development threatened the Yakima Nation's
interest in preservation of agricultural lands. While both
county and tribal zoning laws had as their general purpose the
preservation of agricultural land, each body implemented its
zoning differently. The Yakima Nation did not zone reserva-
tion land according to whether the landowner was Indian or
non-Indian." 6 However, under county zoning, the applicable
111. Id. at 3022 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (citing FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation,
362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960)).
112. Brendale, 109 S. Ct. at 3023 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 3023-24.
115. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside,
828 F.2d 529, 536 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987).
116. Nation's Brief, supra note 15, at 44.
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zoning classification did depend on whether the land was
owned by an Indian or a non-Indian. While all Indian owned
land near the Whiteside II proposed development was desig-
nated exclusively for agricultural use, upon Wilkinson's
request the property was zoned General Rural.117 This county
zoning classification did not restrict the non-Indian from pur-
suing non-agricultural uses. 1 8
When the county agreed to change the zoning classifica-
tion for a particular parcel of reservation land because a non-
Indian landowner wanted to use the land differently, the
county undermined the Tribe's comprehensive plan and the
consistency it was intended to achieve. Whatever the county's
policy may have been, 1 9 its effect only aggravated the checker-
board zoning problem, and circumvented the goal shared by
the tribe and the county of preserving reservation land for
agricultural use. The county's General Rural classification
required half-acre minimum lots, while tribal zoning required
five-acre minimum lots. 20 Consequently, whenever the county
permitted non-Indian landowners to develop and sell half-acre
lots, it thwarted the Yakima Nation's agricultural land preser-
vation policy and defeated its goal of achieving consistency in
reservation land use through comprehensive regulation.
A second compelling argument for tribal zoning acknowl-
edged by the court of appeals is that the Yakima Nation recog-
nized the threat that intense development posed to the area.' 2 1
The land contained soil which was particularly susceptible to
severe erosion and runoff. 2 2 This soil was unsuitable for
development as it posed severe hazards for septic tanks, build-
ings, and streets. 23 Additionally, the court indicated that there
was a sacred Yakima Nation burial ground within one and a
half miles of Wilkinson's property.1 24 Finally, the court of
appeals found that Yakima County had failed to establish any
off-reservation interest in applying its zoning law to the
117. Id. at 45.
118. Id.
119. The Yakima County Code does not state what the county's policy may have
been. See YAKIMA COUNTY, WASH., ZONING CODE (1972).
120. Nation's Brief, supra note 15, at 45.
121. Id. at 50.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside,
828 F.2d, 529, 536 (9th Cir. 1987).
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property.1 2 5
In failing to remand Whiteside II to weigh the various fed-
eral, state, and tribal interests at stake, the Supreme Court
never acknowledged the existence of possible tribal interests in
applying tribal zoning law. As indicated above, however, the
Yakima Nation had a stronger interest in applying its zoning
law. First, the Yakima Nation's uniform application of zoning
law was more apt to preserve reservation lands for agricultural
use.1 2 6 Second, the county failed to establish any off-reserva-
tion interest in applying its zoning law.127 Finally, the Yakima
Nation identified particular environmental, ecological, and cul-
tural risks that the development would impose upon the
land.128 Under the Montana exception, considering these
threats that Wilkinson's development posed to tribal interests,
the Supreme Court should have ruled that tribal zoning law
controlled.
In sum, Brendale conflicts with the lower federal court
trend of applying the Montana exception. 129 The lower court
trend acknowledges the importance of comprehensive land use
planning. Since Euclid, the Supreme Court has also supported
land use regulation that is comprehensive. However, by failing
to endorse the lower federal court view, the Supreme Court
destroyed the Indians' capacity to achieve comprehensive land
use.
1 3 0
B. Land Use Policy Supports Tribal Control
Even without the Montana exception, Yakima Nation zon-
ing should have controlled as a matter of general land use pol-
icy. As the appellate court acknowledged, to endorse tribal
zoning in one instance and then county zoning in another pre-
vents the effective implementation of comprehensive land use
125. Id. When a state alleges that it has an off-reservation interest, it must point
to off-reservation effects that necessitate state intervention. Id.; see, e.g., New Mexico
v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) (Court held that interest in raising
revenues did not justify imposition of state tax on transactions between Indians and
non-Indians).
126. Nation's Brief, supra note 15, at 45.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 50.
129. See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
130. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 109
S. Ct. 2994, 3022-23 (1989).
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regulation.'3 1 When courts preempt tribal regulatory authority
over non-Indian land, they frustrate tribal efforts to regulate
the reservation comprehensively and open the door to a host of
consequent problems.
Under a checkerboard zoning scheme, there is no logic to
reservation land use. For example, in Brendale, the Supreme
Court upheld a non-Indian landowner's ability to develop land
that the Yakima Nation intended to preserve for agricultural
use. Whenever more than one zoning authority is asserted,
conflicts will arise and neither authority will ever achieve com-
prehensive land use regulation. As discussed below, a checker-
board zoning scheme results in unconstitutional regulation,
conflicts, confusion, and uncertainty.1 32
First, checkerboard zoning defeats tribal attempts to
implement comprehensive land use regulation. The notion
that land use regulation should be comprehensive is not only a
practical choice; it is a constitutional requirement. In Euclid133
the Supreme Court held that the constitutionality of zoning
depended upon whether it was applied in light of some greater
plan to benefit the general community.3 3 Thus, a zoning ordi-
nance is unconstitutional whenever it is unrelated to a general
scheme promoting the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare. 35 A zoning ordinance that does not comprehensively
regulate all concerned land for the benefit of the general wel-
fare "passes the bounds of reason and assumes the character of
a merely arbitrary fiat.' 36 Arbitrary zoning laws are unconsti-
tutional because they unduly burden individual property rights
without benefitting the general welfare. 3 7
131. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside,
828 F.2d 529, 534-35 (9th Cir. 1987).
132. See infra notes 133-45 and accompanying text.
133. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see supra notes
4-14 and accompanying text.
134. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
Thus the question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a
building of a particular kind or for a particular use ... is to be determined,
not by an abstract consideration of the building or of the thing considered
apart, but by considering it in connection with the circumstances and the
locality.
Id. (citing Sturgis v. Bridgeman, L.R. 11 Ch. 852, 865).
While Euclid did not contemplate the use of a "comprehensive plan" as termed by
current land use planners, Euclid recognized the importance of zoning with a rational
relation to a legitimate public purpose. Id.
135. Id. at 395.
136. Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 204 (1912).
137. See Euclid, 272 U.S. 365.
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The language in the purpose statement of the Yakima
Nation's zoning code clearly indicates that the Yakima Nation
intended to implement traditional "Euclidean" comprehensive
planning. The purpose statement specifies that the ordinance
exists to "assure the orderly development" of the reservation
"and to otherwise promote the public health, safety, morals
and general welfare in accordance with the rights reserved by
the Yakima Indian Nation." '138 Yet, the Yakima Nation could
not achieve orderly development if the county asserted its
authority to zone the reservation differently. Thus, the con-
current exercise of county and tribal zoning law completely
frustrated the constitutional requirement that zoning serve the
general welfare.
A second policy supporting exclusive application of tribal
zoning on reservations is that, as in Brendale, checkerboard
zoning leads to animosity between non-Indians and Indians.
139
With respect to the problem of overlapping land use regula-
tions, the Supreme Court's Whiteside I opinion conceded that
"the potential for conflict between a county's rules and a
tribe's rules is certainly substantial," but it asserted that such
conflict "is neither inevitable nor incapable of resolution.'
140
Yet, because this potential for conflict always exists, allowing
the concurrent exercise of more than one zoning authority
unnecessarily invites conflict.
141
Land use policy also disfavors checkerboard zoning
because it is confusing and thus leads to needless litigation.
Without a uniform regulatory scheme motivated by one com-
prehensive plan, development of reservation, land will be more
expensive and time consuming as landowners will necessarily
turn to the courts to resolve conflicts.
42
Finally, in addition to the preceding land use policy
problems, checkerboard zoning hinders environmental protec-
tion on the reservation. As with zoning, when more than one
environmental regulatory scheme is in effect, the potential for
138. Nation's Brief, supra note 15, at 47.
139. Comment, The Developing Test for State Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian
Country: Application in the Context of Environmental Law, 61 OR. L. REV. 561, 586
(1982).
140. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 109
S. Ct. 2994, 3013 n.3 (1989).
141. See supra notes 4-14 and accompanying text.
142. Comment, supra note 139, at 586 (Comment examines the history of state
regulatory jurisdiction over Indians and suggests ways that tribes can avoid future
state intervention).
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conflict is great. Given Native Americans' historical and cul-
tural ties to the land.43 and their notions of tribal land tenure
and the Indian's relation to nature and ecology, Indians have a
special interest in protecting reservation resources by develop-
ing tribal environmental protection programs.' Of course,
non-Indian reservation landowners may also have environmen-
tal concerns, so Indians may not have a superior interest in
environmental protection. Nevertheless, unless cooperative
environmental regulatory schemes are developed, it is unlikely
that Indians or non-Indians will be able to achieve adequate
environmental protection.
In summary, given the problems that result from checker-
board zoning, the Supreme Court erred when it provided for
the continuance of the concurrent exercise of two different
reservation zoning schemes. The Court merely perpetuated
the problems created by checkerboard zoning.
VII. CONCLUSION
Given the checkerboard composition of Indian reservations
today, questions arise as to whether federal, state, or tribal
authority governs reservation land use. Brendale establishes
that Indians maintain their power to control reservation land
use over non-Indian landowners only to the extent that tribes
have excluded non-Indians from reservations. Consequently,
on those portions of a reservation where non-Indians are
predominantly present, state, not tribal, zoning law controls.
In so holding, the Court thwarted tribal efforts to compre-
hensively regulate reservation land use. More specifically, in
permitting the concurrent exercise of two, often incompatible,
zoning schemes, the Court left Indian reservations vulnerable
to the evils of checkerboard zoning: uncertainty and conflict
under an incomprehensive and, arguably, unconstitutional zon-
ing scheme.
One obvious solution would have been to allow only one
governing entity to regulate reservation land use. The asser-
tion of state law on Indian land is antithetical to tribal sover-
143. See generally Ackerman, A Conflict Over Land, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 259
(1980) (a thorough analysis of how land, water, and other natural resources are linked
to Indian cultural, spiritual, historical, and religious development).
144. Will, Indian Lands Environment-W97ho Should Protect It, 18 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 465, 499 (1978).
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eignty and duplicative of tribal authority.145 It is for these
reasons that tribal, not state, police power has traditionally
controlled on reservation land.'46 Moreover, when state or fed-
eral governments intervene in tribal government affairs, tribal
governments are less apt to develop and flourish indepen-
dently. 47 Because the Yakima Nation established a viable gov-
ernment recognized by the United States and protected by its
treaty with the United States, the Yakima Nation should have
had controlling authority.
4
Opponents of the position that tribal zoning preempts
state zoning argue that the assertion of tribal authority over
non-Indians is inappropriate because non-Indians do not have a
voice in tribal government. 149 Under the "Euclidean" zoning
scheme, residents have a voice in local government and thus
zoning regulation; however, on reservations, non-Indians gen-
erally do not have a voice in tribal government. 5 °
The inability of non-Indians to participate in tribal govern-
ment constituted a serious defect in the Yakima Nation's zon-
ing scheme. When a municipality attempts to regulate
disenfranchised landowners, the constitutionality of such zon-
ing legislation is highly questionable.' 5 ' Moreover, Oliphant
and Wheeler indicate that the Supreme Court will intervene to
aid non-Indians whenever there is a risk of discriminatory tri-
bal regulation of Indian and non-Indian relations. 52
Notwithstanding this concern about the Yakima Nation's
particular zoning scheme, tribal zoning should control develop-
ment on Indian as well as non-Indian reservation land.153 In
denying the Yakima Nation the right to universally apply its
145. F. COHEN, supra note 30, at 270.
146. Id. In particular, "the presence of tribal governments makes the states'
responsibilities more modest in Indian country, where there are operating tribal
legislatures, courts, police, natural resource agencies, social service bureaus, and often
schools." Wilkinson, Cross-Jurisdictional Conflicts: An Analysis of Legitimate State
Interests on Federal and Indian Lands, 2 J. ENVTL. L. 145, 161 (1982).
147. See Wilkinson, supra note 146, at 162. Indian independence is a congressional
goal. See Indian Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1988).
148. Nation's Brief, supra note 15, at 52.
149. See Reply Brief of Petitioner Stanley Wilkinson at 17-19, Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989).
150. Comment, Jurisdiction to Zone Indian Reservations, 53 WASH. L. REV. 677,
680 (1978).
151. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 72 n.8 (1978).
152. Comment, supra note 150, at 697-98; see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
153. While the issue of the unrepresented non-Indian landowner is a serious
concern, it is beyond the scope of this Note.
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zoning laws, the Brendale Court prevented the tribe from suc-
cessfully implementing comprehensive reservation land use
regulation and aggravated the checkerboard zoning problem to
the detriment of all reservation landowners.
In the aftermath of Brendale, tribes may achieve greater
land use control by providing for the protection of non-Indian
reservation landowners. For example, tribes may wish to give
non-Indians a voice in tribal government." They may also
lobby Congress for a legislative cure to checkerboard zoning,155
or they may use whatever federally delegated environmental
regulatory authority already exists.156 As Brendale did nothing
to remedy the evils of checkerboard zoning, Indians must con-
tinue to strive for more consistency in reservation land use
through comprehensive regulation in order to protect the
health, safety, morals, and general welfare of all reservation
inhabitants.
Jessica S. Gerrard
154. While the Suquamish Tribe has allowed non-Indians to join its planning
council, the tribe has retained ultimate authority. Comment, supra note 150 at 699 &
n.21. Despite the tribe's effort to give non-Indians a voice, for this solution to be
viable, non-Indians must be given a real vote on the council.
155. Indians might propose new federal legislation that addresses the problems
created by checkerboard zoning and provides means by which landowners can achieve
more comprehensive reservation land use. For example, tribes may request that
Congress give Indians delegated federal authority to exclusively zone reservations.
Congress may be amenable to this proposition where the legislation gives non-Indian
landowners a true voice in land use planning.
156. See recent amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(f)-(j)
(Supp. V 1987), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601-15. A tribe's ability to comprehensively regulate
reservation resources does not cure all of the evils of incomprehensive reservation land
use. Unless tribal resources are at stake, a tribe may be unable to control or influence
a question involving checkerboard zoning. Thus, environmental laws may protect
tribal resources, but they will not preserve tribal burial grounds from the threat of
surrounding development.
